As Indonesia considers its future beyond the June 1999 elections -- the first democratic elections in four decades -- it does so nervously, knowing that a worst-case scenario is being played out halfway around the world in Yugoslavia.

Fears are mounting that the Yugoslav-type ethnic and sectarian violence that have wracked Indonesia for more than a year could escalate even further. Hundreds of people have died and thousands of other lives have been scarred, and the danger is that social anarchy may not be far off.

A further threat lies in the specter of Balkanization, a fracturing of the world's fourth most populous nation into hostile pieces akin to Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia.

INDONESIA FACTS 13,000 islands 300 ethnic groups 365 languages

But analysts and Indonesians themselves disagree on just how serious the threat is.

Some insist that the country will remain intact, but in a much looser confederation than has marked the first half-century of its independence. In this scenario, the outer reaches of the vast archipelago will enjoy greater autonomy in civil and economic affairs, but accept Jakarta's sovereignty in matters of defense.

The optimists say that much depends on the outcome of the elections which were held on June 7, 1999.

Cross-currents of violence

Years of political suppression and cultural homogenization under the 32-year rule of former President Suharto and his mostly Javanese regime have left many in the outer islands anxious for more freedom from Jakarta.

During a stand-off between the military and the Free Aceh Movement in January 1999, residents of an Aceh village sided with the rebels

The optimists contend that most non-Javanese Indonesians -- unlike non-Serbian Yugoslavs -- are proud to be Indonesians and genuinely feel part of one nation. They are not ready, according to this view, to turn their individual provinces or regions into small, independent countries if given greater autonomy.

But many others see such thinking -- often attributed to government authorities and academics -- as wishful and unrealistic. They say the parallels between Indonesia and Yugoslavia are too close to ignore, and the violent crosscurrents even more complex and diversified than in the Balkans.

Suharto was Indonesia's Tito -- a very strong leader who held together a religiously, linguistically and culturally diverse country the way Marshal Josip Broz Tito did in Yugoslavia.

The Suharto regime heavily promoted the state philosophy of Pancasila, a basic tenet of which is tolerance for the country's myriad ethnic and religious groups. No one was allowed to preach hatred, although violence did erupt periodically as indigenous Indonesians, or pribumi, targeted the Chinese minority out of social and economic frustration they dared not direct at the government.

But Suharto was forced to resign in 1998, driven from office by an economic crisis and student demonstrations. And his resignation triggered a wave of ethnic violence that could destroy the nation.

A geographic and political absurdity

There is some question among political scientists as to whether Indonesia even qualifies as a nation.

A month of feuding between Christian and Muslim gangs in March 1999 destroyed homes and buildings in Ambon

Spread across 13,600 islands, more than 3,000 miles and four time zones, it is a geographic and political absurdity -- its sole raison d'etre was the desire by the Netherlands and other colonial powers to grab as much territory as possible.

Its multiplicity of dialects, ethnic groups, cultures and religions, along with their remoteness from each other and Jakarta, has made Indonesia more difficult to integrate than the Balkans, but less prone to hostility.

In the Balkans, a dozen ethnic and religious groups live cheek by jowl, competing for land and resources while harboring centuries-old jealousies and resentments.

But centuries of colonization -- and the struggle against the Dutch, in particular -- actually created a sense of unity and common destiny in much of Indonesia. Suharto and his predecessor, Sukarno, worked hard to reinforce that sense of unity and, to some extent, succeeded.

ALSO SEE: Map: Fragile Archipelago

Nevertheless, Indonesia has been beleaguered by smoldering separatist movements almost from the day it won its independence from the Netherlands in 1949. (Indonesians actually proclaimed their independence in 1945 while Japanese troops still occupied the islands. But the Dutch -- with help from the British -- fought to retake the islands for four years before conceding.)

Resentment over 'Javanization'

Today, separatist sentiment is fed by grievances that have been building for years.

East Timorese rally for independence in February 1999

The desire for independence in the outer islands has been fueled by resentment over "Javanization," the belief that Java (the most densely populated piece of real-estate in the world) has used the outer islands as colonies.

Separatists say the government and military have emphasized industrial development in Java while disregarding the plight of economic migrants. They also accuse the authorities of disrespecting the customs and religions of the outer islands.

For decades, the system has bred resentment from Kalimantan to Sulawesi, from Riau to Maluku. But three regions stand out as most vulnerable to the appeals of independence:

• Aceh, a strongly Muslim province on the northwestern tip of Sumatra rich in oil and natural gas, has a low-profile guerrilla movement that has been fighting against domination by Jakarta for more than 15 years.
  
  
• In East Timor, scene of the best-known of the Indonesian separatist movements, Marxist Fretilin guerrillas have waged a war of independence since Indonesia invaded and annexed it in the mid-1970s.
  
  
• In West Papua, Indonesia's eastern-most province, the Free Papua Movement has been fighting for independence since the early 1970s when Indonesia took over the Dutch-administered territory of West New Guinea and renamed it Irian Jaya.

An explosive democracy?

So what are the prospects for holding Indonesia together?

Many astute Indonesia-watchers believe the outlook is dim. The once-mellow, harmonious mix of cultures and religions was a thin veneer protected by Suharto's authoritarianism.

A "democratic" Indonesia, they say, is likely to be far more explosive, as events over the past year have demonstrated. The question is whether anything but force can serve as a national adhesive in this most volatile of countries.